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ARTICLES

LEGAL STRANGERS AND THE DUTY OF
SUPPORT: BEYOND THE BIOLOGICAL TIEBUT HOW FAR BEYOND THE MARITAL TIE?
Laurence C. Nolan*
Copyright © 2000 by Laurence C. Nolan
"...but then I thought well, why should I be paying for a
child that isn't mine?"'
In 1998, Paula Johnson and Carlton Conley discovered
that the child they thought was their biological daughter was
not biologically related to them.' This child, Callie Marie
Conley, had been switched within days of her birth with their
own biological daughter at the hospital where both girls were
born.' The discovery of the mistaken identities occurred only
after Ms. Johnson had initiated a hearing for a formal child
support order. Callie had been born while Johnson and
Conley were living together as unmarried cohabitants. After
they discontinued this living arrangement, Mr. Conley
voluntarily paid child support. When they disagreed about
* J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; B.S., Howard University.
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was developed from a paper presented at the International Society of Family
Law-North American Regional Conference at Albuquerque, N.M., June 10-12,
1999. The author wishes to thank Professor Angela Vallario and Nicole Nolan
for reading earlier drafts, to her research assistants, Nichole Seabron, Jamai
Deuberry, and Deborah Ohiomoba, to Felicia Ayanbiola at the law library, and
to Howard University School of Law for its summer research support.
1. Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
2. See Justin Blum & Michael D. Shear, Of One Mind on Two Children,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 5, 1998, at B1.
3. See id.
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the amount that he should be paying, Ms. Johnson initiated
the hearing for court-ordered support." As a stalling tactic to
delay the hearing, and which he admitted was such, Mr.
Conley disputed for the first time that Callie was not his
biological child. Paternity and maternity tests eventually
proved that neither he nor Ms. Johnson was Callie's biological
parent.5 They eventually learned their biological daughter's
identity and whereabouts.6 The caregivers7 of both girls
(including Johnson and Conley) agreed to leave the girls with
their present caregivers, but all of them would develop a
relationship with the two girls.8 Moreover, Ms. Johnson and
Mr. Conley agreed that they would continue the same close
parenting relationship with Callie as they always had,
including following the same visitation schedule.
Several months after the discovery and after much
publicity of the switch, the Green County Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in Stanardsville, Virginia heard
Ms. Johnson's child support petition. Despite the fact that
both Ms. Johnson and Mr. Conley agreed to continue their
parenting of Callie and their adherence to the same visitation
schedule, Judge Frank Somerville, trial judge, ruled that Mr.
Conley had no legal duty to support her.9 He justified the
ruling by saying, "I can't order child support from people who
aren't parents." °
In another case involving cohabitants," a court ruled that
it could not order a cohabitant to support his nonbiological,
cohabiting child. This judge reasoned that there was no duty
4. See id.
5. See Swapped Girls' Story Takes Tragic Turn / Parents Die Before
Learningof Switch, NEWSDAY, (Nassau and Suffolk), Aug. 4, 1998, at A4.
6. Tragically, the persons who thought they were the biological parents of
Conley's and Johnson's biological daughter were killed in an automobile
accident shortly before they would have learned of the switch. See id.
7. The parents and stepparent of the two deceased persons became the
caregivers of Conley's and Johnson's biological daughter. See id.
8. See Blum & Shear, supra note 2. Since that time, Ms. Johnson filed a
lawsuit to gain custody of her biological daughter. The court denied her
custody, but granted her visitation. See Tamara Jones & Michael D. Shear,
Cradle Will Rock, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2000, (Magazine), at 26.
9. See David Reed, Mother of Switched Baby Retains Custody, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Sept. 22, 1998. In that same
hearing he awarded custody of Callie Marie to Ms. Johnson because there was
no other person petitioning for custody. See id.
10. Id.
11. See Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
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of support, not only because of the missing biological tie
between the cohabitant and the child, but because imposing a
support obligation would contribute to the demise of the
institution of marriage. 2
This article focuses on the duty of support where there is
neither a biological tie nor a marital tie. Part I reviews the
legal theories, principles, and policies that have traditionally
justified the duty of child support where there is no biological
tie. This traditional group of legal strangers can be classified
as either volunteers or draftees. These legal strangers are
typically either stepparents, or husbands whose wives, during
the marriage, gave birth to children of whom they are not the
biological father, or husbands who gave their consent for their
wives to be artificially inseminated by semen from a donor
(A.I.D.).8 Part I concludes by showing that although the most
frequent, recurring factor when a legal stranger has a duty to
support non-biological children is the marital tie between that
person and the child's biological parent, the marital tie is,
however, usually not the basis for imposing the duty of
support for non-biological children.
Part II focuses on
unmarried cohabitants and the legal duty of a cohabitant to
support the child of the cohabitant's partner; that is, this
child is the partner's biological child, but not the biological
child of the cohabitant. This part first explores whether the
traditional legal theories, principles, and policies underlying
the duty of support of traditional legal strangers are
applicable to unmarried cohabitants where there is neither a
biological tie nor a marital tie. Part II, then, considers
whether there are policy issues that would implicate that the
marital tie is a legitimate issue in determining whether to
extend the duty of support to cohabitants for their partners'
biological children.

12. See id. at 701.
13. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968).
14. The term "cohabitants," unless otherwise limited, is inclusive of both
heterosexual and homosexual cohabiting couples.
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I. TRADITIONAL SUPPORT OBLIGORS
A. Persons with a Biological Tie
1. Biological Parents
American society takes for granted that parents are the
first legal obligors for the support of their own biological
children. This notion was not so clear at common law.
Although the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601" did impose a
legal duty on parents to exhaust their resources before the
local parish became obligated for the child, 6 the duty of
support was viewed as a moral duty owed to children by their
parents, not a legal duty. Blackstone concluded that the duty
of support was the parents' moral duty because it was "an
obligation laid on them not only by nature itself, but by their
own proper act in bringing them into the world."'
Support as a moral duty evolved into a legal duty in the
United States. 8 Originally, the father had the primary duty
of support, with the mother being secondarily liable." Today,
both parents are equally responsible for the support of the
child. ' ° Every jurisdiction has legislation imposing the duty of
support on parents for their minor children.' The law also
imposes the duty of support on parents on the public policy
ground of protecting the public purse. Parents, and not the
taxpayers, should be responsible for the support of their

15. See The Act for Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 1 (Eng.).
16. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE 188-89 (2d ed. 1989).
17. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

447 (Cooley 3d ed. 1884).
18. See generally, Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law of
ParentalChild Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807 (1988-89).
19. See id.
20. Most states had imposed the duty of support on both parents prior to the
Supreme Court decisions developing gender as a suspect classification. The
suspect classification standard would require any discrimination based on
gender to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution if the classification did not serve important
governmental purposes and was not substantially related to the achievement of
those purposes. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
21. The legislation includes general statutes imposing the support duty and
child support statutes when the parents are separated. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900-3901 (West 2000).
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children. 2
The duty of support for a child born out-of-wedlock
developed separately in law from the duty of support for a
child born in wedlock. 3 Initially at common law, this child
had no right to be supported by either parent, but the
Elizabethan Poor Laws imposed a legal duty on both
parents. 4 The paternity suit developed to identify fathers in
order to impose the duty of support. 5 In this country, the
mother of a child born out-of-wedlock was liable for her child's
support but the father was usually not liable for support
unless a statute imposed that obligation.'
Since 1973,
constitutional principles regarding the right to paternal
support have eliminated distinctions between children born
in or out-of-wedlock. 7
2. Other Persons With a Biological Tie
As a general rule, persons, other than parents, with a
biological tie to a child are treated as legal strangers and
have no duty to support that child. 8 Such persons may be
grandparents, uncles, aunts, or siblings. At common law, the
Elizabethan Poor Laws required that grandparents as well as
parents exhaust their resources before the local parish
became obligated to the child. 9
No state requires
grandparents to be responsible for minor children although
from time to time states have enacted such statutes for needy
22. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 290 (Ct. App.
1998) (".. .the Legislature has declared its preference for assigning individual
responsibility for the care and maintenance of children, not leaving the task to
the taxpayers. That is why it has gone to considerable lengths to insure that
parents will live up to their support obligations.").
23. See generally Laurence C. Nolan, Unwed Children and Their Parents
Before the United States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely
Participantsin ConstitutionalJurisprudence,29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999).
24. The Act for Relief of the Poor, 1576, 18 Eliz., ch. 3, § 7 (Eng.) & 1601,
43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 7 (Eng.).
25. See id. (imposing civil support duty on father of illegitimate child once
he was identified).
26. See Doughty v. Engler, 211 P. 619 (Kan. 1923) (judicially imposing the
duty of support on fathers).
27. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1977).
28. See Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986, 988 (Ala. 1994).
29. See The Act for Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 7 (Eng.) ("That
the father and grandfather, mother and the grandmother, and the children of
every poor, old and impotent person, or other poor person not able to work of a
sufficient ability, shall at their own charges relieve and maintain every such
person.").
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minor grandchildren." A number of jurisdictions in the
United States also have family expense statutes based on the
Elizabethan Poor Laws or on the civil law expense statutes,
which impose a duty of support on adult children for needy
parents and on parents for their needy adult children.
Approximately 15 states impose a duty upon adult children to
support needy parents, and approximately 25 states impose
such a duty on the parents to support needy adult children.3 '
Even though non-parental blood relatives are usually
treated as legal strangers, they may, however, be responsible
for the support of minor blood relatives under other theories
of law. 2
B. TraditionalObligors Beyond the Biological Tie
1. Parentsof Adopted Children
Adoption is the legal process of creating the parent-child
status regardless of whether there may be a biological tie.33
When neither adoptive parent has a biological tie to the child,
the adoption is frequently referred to as adoption by
strangers.34 Stepparent adoption refers to a situation where a
Some states allow
stepparent adopts the stepchild.35
homosexual couples to adopt.36 When the partner in a
30. Currently, for example, the federal welfare reform law provides that
states may enact procedures to require grandparents to be responsible for
support of needy grandchildren if the parents of those grandchildren are minors
and receiving state assistance. The Act provides in part:
Enforcement of orders against paternal or maternal grandparents.
Procedures under which, at the state's option, any child support order
enforced under this part with respect to a child of minor parents, if the
custodial parent of such child is receiving assistance under the State
program under A of this subchapter, shall be enforceable, jointly and
severally, against the parents of the noncustodial parent of such child.
Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(18) (1998).
31. See LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS: FAMILY AND SUCCESSION LAW U.S. 189 (W. Pintens

ed., & Supp. 1998).
32. See infra Part I.B.2-4.
33. See generally Audra Behne, Balancingthe Adoption Triangle:The State,
the Adoptive Parents and the Birth Parents-Where Does the Adoptee Fit in?, 15
BUFF. J. PUB. INTEREST L. 473 (1997).

34. See MARGARET MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 162 (1994).
35. See id. at 161.
36. See Craig W. Christensen, Legal Orderingof Family Values: The Case of
Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299 (1997); Theresa Glennon,
Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second Parent
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homosexual relationship adopts the partner's child, this
adoption is sometimes referred to as second parent adoption.37
Persons who adopt are treated in the law as biological
parents.38 The parental tie is created by law instead of by
blood. Adoptive parents, therefore, have the same duty of
support for their minor children as do biological parents.39
This duty should not be surprising since adoption is
voluntary.
Adoptive parents, like biological parents,
voluntarily obligate themselves to support the adopted child.
2. Stepparents"
Although the majority of legal strangers who may owe a
duty of support to children who are not related to them,
either biologically or by adoption, is stepparents, the
stepparent relationship usually does not create a duty of
support.4 At common law, there was no duty for a stepparent
to support a stepchild because of the status of the
relationship.42 Most states continue to follow that rule.43
Nevertheless, at common law, stepparents were liable for the
support of stepchildren in their care if they created the status
of in loco parentis." In loco parentis literally means in place
of a parent.45 That is, a person voluntarily and intentionally
assumes the role of a parent for a child.46 The status of in loco
Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 255, n.2 (1998).
37. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. County 1992); In re B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); see also, Catherine Connolly, The Description of Gay and
Lesbian Families in Second-ParentAdoption Cases, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 225

(1998); Glennon, supra note 36.
38. See MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 161.
39. See id.

40. As used in this article, a stepparent is defined as the spouse of a parent
who has children by a prior marriage that ended in divorce or death or the
spouse of a parent who has children born out-of-wedlock prior to the marriage.
In this article, a husband whose wife has a child born during their marriage but

who is not his biological child is classified under the term legal fathers, but may
be considered as a stepfather. See infra Part I.B.3.
41. See Rutkowski v. Wasko, 286 A.D. 327, 331 (N.Y. 1955).

42. See, e.g., Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985).
43. See, e.g., Ulrich v. Cornell, 484 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Wis. 1992). See infra

note 68 (listing state statutes imposing the duty of stepparent support).
44. See, e.g., Lantz v. Frey & Wife, 14 Pa. 201 (1850); Harmon v.
Department of Soc. and Health Servs., State of Wash., 951 P.2d 770, 774 n.7
(Wash. 1998).
45. See Harmon, 951 P.2d at 774 n.7.
46. See Austin v. Austin, 22 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Neb. 1946).
A person standing in loco parentis to a child is one who has placed
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parentis terminates at the will of the person.4 7
A stepparent, accordingly, creates the in loco parentis
relationship when he or she voluntarily and intentionally
takes the child into his or her home and assumes
responsibility for the child. It is usually the residential
stepparent who would most likely create the in loco parentis
relationship and who also would most likely be a stepfather.
During the relationship the stepparent assumes the
obligation for the support of the child.' 8 The stepparent can
terminate the relationship at will because the in loco parentis
relationship depends upon the intention of the stepparent to
assume the relationship. 9 In most instances, the relationship
terminates when the marriage ends."° The practical effect of
the in loco parentis status usually accrues to third parties
who may be reimbursed for the cost of necessities provided for
the child. 1
A stepparent may also become liable for the support of
stepchildren if he or she voluntarily contracts to do so, either
explicitly or implicitly.52 The duty of support arises from and
is defined by their private agreement. 3 Unless prohibited by
himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations
incident to the parental relation, without going through the formalities
necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and liabilities of
such person are the same as those of the lawful parent. The
assumption of the relation is a question of intention, which may be
shown by the acts and declarations of the person alleged to stand in
that relation.
47. See id.
48. The support duty is only during the in loco parentis relationship. See
generally MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 16-22.
49. Whether or not the in loco parentis relationship exists is a question of
fact in each case because intent is a factor in classifying the relationship. See
Rutkowski v.Wasko, 286 A.D. 327, 331 (N.Y. 1955).
50. See Deal v. Deal, 545 So. 2d 780 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (After divorce,
when stepchildren are no longer in the stepparent's custody, there is no in loco
parentis status and the stepparent is under no obligation to support the
stepchildren.); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968) (In loco parentis status
existed during marriage and stepparent had a duty to support wife's child but
status ends at divorce unless stepparent intends to continue his in loco parentis
status.).
51. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 42-43 (1984); Note,
Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis Relationships, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1939).
52. See generally, MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 27-31.
53. See Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968) (no express agreement existed to
bind the stepparent after divorce; the court found the promise was an
inducement to marry and an offer of support for the child while in the same
household).
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the statute of frauds, proving and enforcing oral agreements
depends on the jurisdiction.54 Of course, oral and implied
agreements may be difficult to prove. 5 The remedies for the
enforcement of the agreement to pay support are those of
contract law.56
A stepparent may also be liable for the support of
stepchildren if a jurisdiction extends the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to stepparents.57 The doctrine of equitable estoppel
requires the proof of three elements: representation, reliance,
and detriment.58 The party requesting that the court apply
the doctrine must prove that the other party made a
representation, upon which he or she relied to his or her
detriment. The underlying principle of the doctrine is to
bring about fair and just results in the case.59 In stepparent
cases, the facts would prove that the stepparent made a
representation that the stepparent would support the
stepchildren, and that the stepchildren or their parent relied
upon the representation to their detriment. Applying the
doctrine, the stepparent would be estopped from using the
defense that a stepparent has no duty of support to the
stepchildren.
The form of the representation may either be verbal or
conduct. ° Frequently, the element that is the most difficult
to prove is detriment. Most courts have defined detriment to
mean financial detriment, but have narrowly interpreted the

54. See id.
55. See Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1997) (finding
no evidence of implied contract).
56. See Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396 (Md. 1980) (Stepparent signed a
separation agreement agreeing to support the stepchild. The separation
agreement was incorporated in the judgment of divorce. The court would not
enforce the agreement using the contempt power of the court, reasoning the
obligation for support was not the court's order relating to family support
obligation but was a contract obligation.).
57. Some jurisdictions do not extend the doctrine to stepparents or other
legal strangers. See, e.g., NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that Virginia courts have never applied equitable estoppel in the context
of child support, and on the facts before the court the requirements for an
estoppel were not met).
58. See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984).
59. See id. at 360.
60. See Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d at 117 ("[Dlefendant has not asserted any
specific conduct or representations by plaintiff.... Defendant offers no support
for the implied proposition that merely seeking joint legal custody amounts to
an affirmative representation by plaintiff to support her former stepchildren.").
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meaning of financial detriment."
The courts usually
interpret financial detriment to mean that the stepparent's
representation "causes the [child] to be cut off from the
[child's] noncustodial natural parent's support.""
Furthermore, the development of an emotional bonding is
usually not an example of reliance for ordering support.63
Courts have rejected emotional reliance for several reasons,
such as penalizing stepparents who develop a warm family
environment. Stepparents might also incur a duty to support
the children when the marriage ended.64 Finally, courts want
to encourage stepparents to develop a warm relationship with
stepchildren which is in the stepchildren's interests.65 The
purpose of applying the doctrine cautiously is to encourage
voluntary support of children during the marriage."
The equitable estoppel doctrine, like contract principles,
usually requires the stepparent to have the duty of support
after the stepparent status ends. Thus, cases applying the
equitable estoppel doctrine usually arise when the stepparent
and the parent are divorcing.
Finally, the law imposes a duty of support on the basis of
the stepparent status only if there is a statute imposing the
duty." There are approximately eighteen jurisdictions with
such statutes, which set forth the circumstances giving rise to

61.
62.
(Utah
63.
64.

See MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 32.

Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d at 117 (quoting Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 702
1985)).
See Miller, 478 A.2d at 358.
See id.

65. See id.
66. See Ulrich v. Cornell, 484 N.W.2d 545, 548-49 (Wis. 1992).

67. For extended discussion on stepparent child support obligation imposed
by state law, see MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 38-41, and Mahoney, supra note

51, at 43-45. The treatment of stepfamilies under federal law is beyond the
scope of this article. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal
Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (1987) (analyzing federal law); Sarah H. Ramsey
& Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: A Comparative
Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and English Experience, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 672, 676-80 (1985) (analyzing federal law).

Unlike America, England and many of the Canadian Provinces impose a
duty of support on stepparents. For English law, see Ramsey & Masson, id.
(analyzing English laws that require residential stepparents to support
stepchildren and in some cases after divorce). For Canadian provinces, see
R.S.A. 1980 c. M-1 sl (Alta. 1998) (defining child to include stepchild); Family
Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1998, c. 128 sl (defining parent to include stepparent
under certain conditions).
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the duty of support. 68 None of the statutes explicitly impose
the duty of support beyond the marriage. Several of the
statutes are unimportant because they merely codify the in
loco parentis doctrine, where the stepparent can terminate
this relationship at will.69 Some limit the duty only to
destitute stepchildren or prevent the stepparent from
unilaterally terminating the relationship. 0 As a whole, most
of the statutes are limited and do not provide a meaningful
source for imposing the duty of support based upon the status
of the marital tie.71
In sum, without a state statute imposing the duty of
support on stepparents, they do not have an obligation to
support stepchildren unless they voluntarily agreed to do so
under the theories of in loco parentis, contract law, or
equitable estoppel. They are seldom volunteers because of
the marital tie.
3. Legal Fathersof Non-biologicalChildren
The husband of a married woman is presumed to be the
legal father of a child born during the marriage, 2 and,
thereby, now as a parent, has the legal duty to support the
child. Thus, there is a presumption of legitimacy for a child
born during a marriage.7 3 This presumption is one of the
oldest presumptions in the law.7 4 The presumption is a
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4
(1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.2(1) (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §

205.310 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (West 1998); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 62.044 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:1-A:2 (1998); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 1998); N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 101 (1998); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09 (1998); OKFLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (West 1998); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.053 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (Michie 1998); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 1998); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 49.195 (West 1998).
69. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 15
(1998).
70. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 (1998).
71. See Mahoney, supra note 51, at 43.
72. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Miscovich v.
Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
73. The presumption of legitimacy serves several purposes. For example, it
protects children from the legal disabilities of being born out-of-wedlock as well
as from the social disabilities associated with the stigma from the status of
illegitimacy. See Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 728.
74. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. This presumption is also known as the
marital presumption. See Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital
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This

presumption usually affects two groups of husbands who have
no biological tie to the child. The wives of the first group are
impregnated by men, who are not their husbands, either
during the marriage or prior to the marriage. The resulting
child is born during the marriage. The wives of the second
group are artificially inseminated from donors who are not
their husbands. In both instances, there is a presumption
that the husband is the father of the child because the child
was born during the marriage.
The first group of husbands usually raises the issue of
nonpaternity in divorce actions so that the law will not
impose the parental duty of support.7" In the past, courts
were reluctant to allow a child to lose his or her status of
legitimacy by the presumed father proving nonpaternity.77
With the rapid minimization of the stigma of illegitimacy and
the proof of paternity becoming more and more accurate,
allowing identification of the biological father, courts often
allow the husband to prove nonpaternity.5 Most of the cases
now raise the issue of whether a husband should be estopped
from proving nonpaternity where he was not deceived and
knew that he was not the child's biological father, but
accepted and agreed to the status as father of the child."9
Where there was no deception to the husband many courts
apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as they have in the
stepparent cases. °
Clevenger v. Clevenger is usually cited as the seminal
case for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
presumed fathers. Clevenger required proof of the elements
of representation, reliance, and detriment.82
It limited
Presumption:A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988).
75. In some jurisdictions, it may be conclusive. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §
621 (West 1987) (after a period of time the presumption becomes conclusive).
76. See Natalie A. Minton, Equitable Estoppel Precludes Husband in
DivorceProceeding From Refuting Paternityto Avoid Child-Support PaymentsPietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994), 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (1995).
77. See, e.g., Cleo A. E. v. Rickie Gene E., 438 S.E.2d 886, 888 (W. Va. 1993).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 890.
80. Some commentators and courts would classify these husbands as
stepparents. See supra note 40.
81. 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Ct. App. 1961). It is also cited as the seminal
stepparent case applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See supra note 40,
defining the term stepparent as used in this article.
82. See Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 713-17.
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detrimental reliance to financial detriment. The court,
however, construed financial detriment to mean that as the
result of this representation and reliance, the child lost his or
her opportunity
for paternal support from the natural
3
parent.1

The Clevenger court did note the emotional injury to the
child if the parent-child relationship was suddenly
discarded.84 Several recent court decisions seem to apply the
doctrine when the detriment is emotional, not just when it is
financial.
In M.H.B. v. H.T.B.,85 the court seemed to
emphasize the psychological detriment the child would suffer.
Although the natural father was not exempt from his support
obligation, the court did not require the showing that the
natural father was unavailable to support the child before
applying the doctrine.86
Similar to the stepparent cases, these husbands may also
voluntarily bind themselves to support their non-biological
children under contract law or the doctrine of in loco
88 Under contract principles, such contracts may be
parentis.
explicit or implicit. Likewise, oral agreements would be valid
if the statute of frauds did not apply. Furthermore, contract
remedies would apply to their enforcement.
In Clevenger, the court found that a presumed father had
established in loco parentis status with the child because he
had assumed parental obligation for the child.8" The in loco
parentis status, therefore, would be established in almost all
cases where the husband assumes all of the obligations of a
parent and holds the child out as his biological child. The
status, however, would terminate when he wants to prove
nonpaternity.
The second group includes husbands of wives who have
been artificially inseminated by donor sperm. They usually
raise the issue of nonpaternity at divorce so that the duty of
Artificial
parental support will not apply to them.
83. See id. at 717.
84. See id. at 716.
85. 498 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985).
86. See id.; see also Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994); Minton,
supra note 76.
87. See Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997) (would enforce if facts
proved a contract).
88. See Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 710-12.
89. See id.
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insemination is the process of conception by inserting sperm
into a woman's cervix." If the sperm is from a man other
than the woman's husband, the process is known as
heterologous insemination or artificial insemination by donor
(A.I.D.).9' There would be no biological tie between the
woman's child and her husband. Yet, in most cases in which
he consents to the procedure, the husband is the child's legal
father and responsible for the child's support. This result
happens because the majority of states have codified the
principle that husbands who consent to artificial
insemination by a donor are the legal fathers of the children.9"
Therefore, the law imposes upon them the parental duty of
support.
Prior to the widespread enactment of these statutes,
courts usually applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
preventing fathers from asserting nonpaternity, based upon
their consent to the procedure and the wife's reliance to her
detriment when he wants to disclaim paternity.9" People v.
Sorensen,94 an influential case for applying the doctrine of
equitable estoppel in such cases, reasoned that:
[A] reasonable man who, because of his inability to
procreate, actively participates and consents to
this wife's artificial insemination in the hope that
a child will be produced whom they will treat as
their own, knows that such behavior carries with
it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and
criminal responsibility for nonsupport. One who
consents to the production of a child cannot create
a temporary relation to be assumed and
disclaimed at will, but the arrangement must be of
such character as to impose an obligation of
supporting those for whom existence he is directly
responsible.9"
90. See Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public
Matter?, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 3 (1997); Walter Wadlington, Artificial
Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 468-73 (1983).
91. See Wadlington, supra note 90.
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
40/3-3(a) (West 1998); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.101(a) (West 1998).
93. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 287 (Ct. App.
1998) (noting that prior to the enactment of California's statute, California
courts had used the common law doctrine of estoppel).
94. 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968).
95. Id. at 285.
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In R.S. v. R.S., 9 the court, approving Sorensen's
rationale, held that a husband who had not met the
requirements of the Kansas artificial insemination statute
imposing the support obligation for the resulting child was
still obligated to support the child because he had consented
to artificial insemination by donor. In stating its holding, the
court reasoned that
[A] husband who with his wife orally consents to
the treating physician that his wife be
heterologously inseminated for the purpose of
producing a child of their own is estopped to deny
that he is the father of the child, and he has
impliedly agreed to support the child and act as
its father.97
Similarly in Gursky v. Gursky,9" the court stated that
"[h]ence, it is reasonable to presume that she was induced so
to act and thus changed her position to her detriment in
reliance upon the husband's expressed wishes."99
In such cases, some courts would also apply contract law.
In Gursky, the court held that a husband's consent to
artificial insemination by donor and the wife's agreeing and
submitting to the procedure constituted an implied contract. °
One might also conclude that during the marriage these
husbands would be liable for the support of a child conceived
through artificial insemination by a donor under the doctrine
of in loco parentis since they have accepted the child into the
home and assumed parental responsibilities.'0 '
Thus, as discussed above, husbands, who are legal
fathers of non-biological children born to their wives, are not
allowed to disprove paternity when their voluntary action to
support these children falls within the theories of in loco
parentis, contract law, or equitable estoppel,' or where the
presumption of legitimacy is conclusive. In the case of
artificial insemination by donor, most states have enacted
statutes preventing them from proving nonpaternity where
96. 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Id. at 928.
98. 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
99. Id. at 412.
100. See id. at 411-12. This court also held that he would have been liable for
the child's support on the theory of equitable estoppel. See id.
101. See supra note 46 (defining in loco parentis).
102. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
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they have consented to the procedure. The basis of these
statutes is the codification of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, which is predicated upon the husband's voluntary
conduct of agreeing to parent a child born by artificial
insemination by donor
and the detrimental reliance by the
10 3
wife and the child.

4. Others
There are still others who traditionally have become
obligors to support non-biological children.
This group
typically consists of men who marry women who have given
birth to a child born out-of-wedlock.'0 4

After the marriage,

they acknowledge paternity of the wife's child. A similar
group consists of men who do not contest paternity actions.' °5
Thus, the duty of support is imposed at this point because of
their acknowledgment of parenthood.' Later, they want to
prove nonpaternity. These two groups of non-biological
parents, even if they could show their acknowledgment of
paternity was false, could remain obligors for support under
the doctrine of in loco parentis,equitable estoppel doctrine, or
contract law. The doctrine of in loco parentis could apply to
most of these non-biological fathers because they took the
children into their homes and assumed parental obligations."7
Courts have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel as they
have done in the stepparent cases when the facts support the
elements of the doctrine.' Courts have also applied contract
103. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
104. See Lewis v. Lewis, 381 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (after marriage
husband signed birth certificate as the biological father of wife's child who was
born three years prior to the marriage and whose biological father was not the
husband); Ross v. Ross, 314 A.2d 623 (N.J. J. & D. R. 1973), affd 342 A.2d 566
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (after marriage husband filed certificate
admitting paternity of wife's 18-month old child born prior to his marriage
although he was not the child's biological parent).
105. See Watcher v. Ascero, 550 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1988) (putative father did not
challenge paternity, but voluntarily acknowledged paternity and agreed to a
support order).
106. See supra Part I, § I.A.1 (Biological parents are obligated to support
their children.).
107. See Lewis, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (During the marriage the husband
raised and supported the child "as his own.").
108. See Watcher, 550 A.2d at 1019 (court held putative father was equitably
estopped from later challenging paternity when his acknowledgment of
paternity was voluntary); Lewis, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (court held husband liable
for the support of his wife's child who was born before the marriage, but whom
he had acknowledged after his marriage on the theory of equitable estoppel);
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law if the facts presented an express or implied contract to
support the child. 9
With the advances in reproductive technology, cases
involving artificial insemination and non-biological children
have risen more than those pertaining to a married couple
and a male donor. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca,"' a
husband and wife desired a child and entered into a surrogate
contract.
Neither the husband, nor the wife, nor the
surrogate had a biological tie to the resulting child because
none of them were genetically related to the child."' The
husband wanted to prove nonpaternity when he and his wife
divorced. The court, in determining that the artificial
insemination statute would apply in this situation,
emphasized that the statute was based on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, where he had caused the conception of the
child."' The court also emphasized that he had a contractual
agreement, a surrogacy agreement, providing for the birth of
this child and thereby, had caused the birth of the child."'
Similarly, in artificial insemination cases involving
homosexual couples, courts have applied the principle of
equitable estoppel when one of the partners wants to prove
nonpaternity or nonmaternity so that there would be no
obligation for support. In Karin T. v. Michael T.,"' a New
York court applied the equitable estoppel doctrine to hold the
lesbian partner of a woman responsible for the support of the
woman's two children where the lesbian partner had agreed
to these children's conception by artificially inseminating
their mother. The court stated that "her course of conduct...
brought into the world two innocent children.""' It would also
Ross, 314 A.2d at 623 (court held that husband, who had acknowledged
paternity of his wife's child born prior to the marriage, was estopped from
denying that he was the child's parent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 429 A.2d
833 (Conn. App. Ct. 1979) (even though husband acknowledged paternity of his
wife's child born prior to the marriage, the elements of equitable estoppel were
not proven because no detrimental reliance was proven).
109. See Lewis, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (court also held husband liable for the
support of wife's child (not his biological child) born prior to the marriage, but
whom he had voluntarily acknowledged after marriage on an implied contract
theory).
110. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
111. See id. at 282-83, 288.
112. See id. at 286-88.
113. See id. at 288-89.
114. 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
115. Id. at 784.
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follow, as in the other artificial insemination cases, that the
principles of in loco parentis and contract law would apply to
artificial insemination involving homosexual couples if the
facts presented these same principles." 6
Another group is strangers who take a child into their
home to rear but do not adopt the child."7 Later, they do not
want to support the child. The creation of the in loco parentis
status would occur when they took the child into their home
and assumed parental obligations." 8 It would terminate,
however, when they no longer wanted to support the child.
Depending upon the circumstances, some courts have applied
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.. 9 and contract law'2 ° to find
a continuing obligation for support even when the in loco
parentis status ended.
Similarly, in cases in which there is a biological tie but
not the parental tie, courts have found the existence of an in
When that relationship has
loco parentis status.'
116. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (App. Div. 1963)
(finding an implied contract in a husband and wife artificial insemination by
donor case).
117. See A.S. v. B.S. 354 A.2d 100 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), affd 374
A.2d 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (A couple prior to their marriage
received a non-biological infant child into their home to rear. The child
continued to live with the couple after they married, but no formal adoption
occurred. The husband no longer wanted to be responsible for the child's
support when the couple divorced.); see also Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 818
(App. Div. 1970) (A married couple received an infant child into their home to
adopt but did not adopt the child. When they divorced after a long separation,
the husband objected to a support order because he was not the child's natural
or adopted parent.).
118. See A.S., 354 A.2d at 102 ("[Tlhere is no doubt that, under the classic
definition of the doctrine, defendant stood in loco parentis to [the child] from
March 1963 until January 1972, the date the parties separated.").
119. See id. at 102-03 (court applied doctrine of equitable estoppel because
defendant had voluntarily sought the child to rear and his intent to abandon his
support obligation would cause irreparable harm to the child).
120. See Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18. The court in Wener found that the
husband had impliedly agreed to support a child when he took the child into his
home with the intention to adopt and imposing the duty to support the child
when the parties divorced "upon the dual foundation of an implied contract to
support the child and equitable estoppel." Id. at 818.
121. See Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1994) (Where grandfather
and his wife (the step-grandmother) sought and obtained legal custody of his
granddaughter, the court held that he stood in loco parentis with the child. His
duty of support based on the in loco parentis status ended when he petitioned
the court to give custody to his wife at the time of their divorce. The court,
however, held that the grandfather continued to have a duty to support the
granddaughter when the divorce court awarded custody of the grandchild to his

2000]

LEGAL STRANGERS' DUTY OF SUPPORT

19

terminated, some courts have also employed the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to find a continuing obligation for
support. 122 One could also conclude that a relative might
enter into an express or implied contract to support a nonbiological child as has been enforced in other non-biological
cases, such as the stepparent cases.'23 Finally, courts have
enforced contracts when third parties have guaranteed a
parent's support. When the parent fails to pay the support,
the court has enforced the contract and required the
guarantor to pay the 124
support as long as the contract was not
against public policy.
C.

Summary of the TraditionalTheories, Principles,and
Policies
The general policy underlying the duty of support is that
natural parents should be responsible for the support of their
children. It is by their own conduct that their biological child
is born.2 2
The legislature of each state has codified the
natural parent's duty of support.2 2 As long as the parental tie
is not legally terminated, parents remain responsible for the
support of their minor children. A corollary policy is that
parents and not taxpayers should be responsible for their
wife.).
122. See In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1975) (An uncle
was estopped to deny his duty to support his nephew. The uncle had brought
him to the U.S. as an infant with a forged birth certificate as his son and
thereafter raised him as his son.).
123. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 34, at 27-31 (discussing stepparent
cases).
124. See Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852 (1975). A third party, in
connection with the negotiation of a separation agreement between a husband
and wife, executed a guaranty with the wife, guaranteeing the husband's
support obligation to his children in the custody of the wife. When the husband
stopped paying support, the court enforced the guaranty agreement because it
did not violate the public policy against promoting divorce because the marriage
was "beyond redemption." Id. at 208; Kovler v. Vagenheim, 130 N.E.2d 557
(Mass. 1955) (brothers of wife and husband signed a premarital agreement
indemnifying husband for any support duty to wife and children, and the
premarital agreement was enforceable after husband obtained divorce because
the agreement supported marriage); but see Capazzoli v. Holzwasser, 490
N.E.2d 420 (Mass. 1986) (A third party and a married woman entered into an
oral agreement that if she abandoned her marriage, the third party would
support her and her children. She abandoned the marriage. The agreement
was unenforceable because it violated the state's public policy of unreasonably
encouraging divorce.).
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. See supra note 21.
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children's support." 7 These policies partly explain the reason
why the marital tie is no longer the deciding factor for the
duty of support for biological children.
The majority of legal strangers, owing a duty of support
to non-biological children, are stepparents and legal fathers.
Thus, the marital tie appears to be the recurring factor for
non-biological support duty. As Part I has shown, the marital
tie itself is usually not the source for imposing the obligation
to support non-biological children. Except for statutes that
may impose a duty of support or when the presumption of
legitimacy is conclusive, the underlying theory that a person
has an obligation to support a non-biological child is that the
person has volunteered to support the child, either explicitly
or implicitly." 8 Accordingly, the principles and doctrines that
courts have employed base the obligation on the voluntary
conduct of the legal stranger. Thus, a person voluntarily
creates the in loco parentis relationship. A person voluntarily
creates a support contract. A person has voluntarily made
representations which others rely upon to their detriment. If
a person voluntarily binds him or herself to support a nonbiological child so that such binding would normally fall
within principles of doctrinal law, then it seems just and fair
that doctrinal law should apply. In light of these principles
and doctrines, the marital tie is more an illusion than a fact
when it comes to bases for non-biological support for
traditional legal strangers. Therefore, obligation by their own
conduct is the link between the duty of child, support of
parents and that of traditional legal strangers.
II. UNMARRIED COHABITANTS AND THE COHABITANT'S LEGAL
DUTY TO SUPPORT THE CHILD OF THE COHABITANT'S PARTNER

The question of whether a legal stranger should be
legally responsible for the support of someone else's child
becomes even more poignant with cohabitants. According to
statistics, there are 1,520,000 unmarried couples living as
cohabitants with minor children." 9 With these numbers, the
127. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 290 (Ct. App.
1998).
128. See supra Part I.B.
129.
DATA

See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL
68, UNMARRIED COUPLES, BY SELECTED
No.
TABLE
BOOK,

CHARACTERISTICS: 1980 TO 1998 [hereinafter STATISTICS].

These statistics do
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state has legitimate interests in the welfare of children living
in these cohabitation arrangements. 3 ' Part II explores the
circumstances in which cohabitants might be legally
responsible for the support of biological children of their
partners when they have no biological tie to these children.
First, Part II.A examines whether the theories, policies, and
principles that presently justify the duty of support of
traditional legal strangers beyond the biological tie should
extend to include cohabitants. Then, Part II.B considers
whether there are policy issues that would implicate that the
marital tie is a legitimate issue of concern in extending the
duty of support to cohabitants for their partner's biological
children.
A. Are the TraditionalLegal Theories, Principles,and
Policiesfor Imposing the Duty of Support on Legal
StrangersApplicable to Cohabitants?
The underlying theory of imposing the duty of support on
traditional legal strangers is that they have volunteered to
support children with whom they have no biological tie.'
This volunteering is such that society has found it to be just
and fair as well as a matter of public policy to give legal
consequences as part of our private law.'32 This section
explores whether the law should treat cohabitants as
traditional legal strangers if they volunteer to support the
children of their partners, whose children are not their
biological children.

not differentiate between heterosexual cohabiting couples with common
biological children and those with non-biological children. These statistics do
not include homosexual couples.
130. "Cohabitation is a relationship that is unlike the legal and common law
marriage. It is a status arranged by the parties without the state's approval and
without the need of a divorce decree to terminate the relationship. (Footnote
omitted)." Hector Louis Lugo, Estate Planning and Cohabitation Rights of
Nonmarital Partners,51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 41, 43 (1979).
131. See supra Part I.B-C.
132. With stepparents, some parts of our society have ignored whether the
legal stranger has volunteered and have imposed the obligation by law based on
the status. See supra note 68. With legal fathers, some jurisdictions have also
ignored whether the legal stranger has volunteered and have imposed the
obligation by law under the conclusive presumption of legitimacy. See supra
note 75.
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1. TraditionalTheories, Principles,and Policies
Cohabitation arrangements were, until recently, illicit
and meretricious living arrangements. 3 Marvin v. Marvin'34
is the seminal case in which a court held that cohabiting
couples may enter into contracts as long as they could be
Therefore,
severed from the meretricious relationship.
housekeeping, being a companion, and other such domestic
services or giving up employment to provide such domestic
services may be consideration for the promise of support."'
Additionally, the Marvin court held that other equitable
principles might apply. 3 ' This section first examines facts
and holdings of three cases similar to Marvin that have
raised the issue of imposing the duty of support for nonbiological children on cohabitants. Then, this section argues
that the duty of support should extend to cohabitants under
the traditional theories of in loco parentis, contract law, and
equitable estoppel.
a. Three Cases
37 when her
unmarried
In Zaragoza v. Capriola,'
cohabitation with Dr. Capriola ended, Ms. Zaragoza
petitioned the court to impose on Dr. Capriola a duty of
support for her child by a previous marriage. She alleged
that Dr. Capriola had promised her that he would support
this child and told her not to pursue any request for child
support or arrears from her former husband. She alleged
that she relied upon this representation to her child's
detriment since Dr. Capriola refused to support the child.
Ms. Zaragoza argued that her case was analogous to
133. See generally, Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust
Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47
(1978); William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried
Cohabitants:A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677
(1984).
134. 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976) (When the Marvins stopped cohabiting as an
unmarried couple, Ms. Marvin alleged that the parties had entered into an oral
agreement that provided that while they lived together they would combine
their efforts and earnings, they would share equally any property accumulated
because of their efforts and earnings, they would hold themselves out as
husband and wife, and she would render her services as a companion,
homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to Mr. Marvin.).
135. See id. at 665-74.
136. See id. at 674-82.
137. 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
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Miller v. Miller.38 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had extended the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
stepparents who make representations
to support
stepchildren, and who discourage the natural father from
supporting them."9 Ms. Zaragoza argued that Miller's
rationale of applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel should
also apply to her case. She had relied upon Dr. Capriola's
representation to her child's financial detriment.
The
Zaragoza court, however, distinguished Miller and held that
Miller applied to stepparents, not cohabitants.14 °
In Thomas v. LaRosa,' when the parties stopped
cohabiting, Ms. Thomas petitioned the court, alleging that
Mr. LaRosa had breached an oral contract that he would
support her and her children from a previous marriage.
During the cohabitation, Mr. LaRosa provided Ms. Thomas
with a stipend of $3,000 a month, covered the household
expenses, and supported and educated her children. Before,
during, and after their cohabitation, Mr. LaRosa was legally
married to another woman. The court held that it would
enforce a contract between unmarried cohabitants if it were a
legitimate business contract, but the contract in this case
amounted to a contract of common law marriage, which was
illegal in West Virginia.' The court further emphasized that
Mr. LaRosa had an existing wife.
In Featherston v. Steinhoff,'3 when their cohabitation
ended, Ms. Featherston brought a breach of contract action
against Mr. Steinhoff, alleging that he had agreed to support
her and her children from a previous marriage. In return,
she had rendered domestic services to him. The court would
enforce the contract if she proved an explicit contract or an
implied-in-fact contract of support. In Michigan, the law
presumes the rendering of domestic services to be
gratuitous.'
Ms. Featherson did not overcome this
presumption and prove that her services were consideration
for his promise of support.
The facts of these three cases would appear to be typical
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
See id. at 362.
See Zaragoza, 492 A.2d at 701.
400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990).
See id. at 815.
575 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
See id. at 9.
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in cohabitation arrangements raising the issue of whether
cohabitants should owe a duty of support to their partner's
child when the child is not their biological child. The next
section argues that the duty of support should extend to
cohabitants for the support of the child if the traditional
principles of in loco parentis, contract law, or equitable
estoppel would apply.
b. Applying the Principlesof In Loco Parentis,
ContractLaw, and EquitableEstoppel to
Cohabitants
Unless the application of the principles of in loco
parentis, contract law, or equitable estoppel is illegal in a
jurisdiction, applying these principles on the basis of a
cohabitant's voluntary conduct to support non-biological
cohabiting children seems just and fair when traditional
145
In
obligors are obligated under these principles.
severance
Marvin's
jurisdictions which do not recognize
doctrine,'4 6 cohabitants cannot enforce express or implied-infact contracts for support of non-biological children.
Cohabitants in jurisdictions that follow Marvin's severance
doctrine may still not be able to prove a contract if the
jurisdiction applies the presumption that domestic services
rendered during a meretricious relationship are gratuitous.
The plaintiff must overcome the presumption with proof that
both the parties expected compensation for the services.'4 7
There is no reason, however, not to enforce contracts for
the support of non-biological children in jurisdictions that
allow cohabitants to contract. For example, in stepparent
cases and other cases as discussed in Part I, promises to
support non-biological children are enforced if a contract is
A support obligation is not based upon the
proved.
relationship between the parties, but on whether there is a
contract. Thus, in Thomas, the West Virginia court refused to
enforce the contract to support the child of the partner of the
cohabitant because the consideration for that promise was
based on the illicit relationship. 4 ' On the other hand, the
Michigan court in Featherson would have enforced the
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See

supra Part I.B-C.
discussion supra Part II.A.1.
Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 813 (W. Va. 1990).
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promise to support if it had found consideration. 9
Persons who create the in loco parentis relationship
assume the duty of support during the relationship.'
Without any reason to the contrary, in loco parentis status
should be recognized in cohabitation arrangements, even in
jurisdictions finding the cohabitation illegal. Marriage does
not create the in loco parentis status for stepparents. It is not
limited to stepparents. The status is created when any
person voluntarily and intentionally assumes the obligations
incidental to the parental relationship and discharges them.'
52 Thomas v.
Thus, the facts in Zaragoza v. Capriola,'
5
LaRosa, ' and Feathertonv. Steinhoff '" demonstrate that Dr.
Capriola, Mr. LaRosa, and Mr. Steinhoff created the status of
in loco parentis with their partner's children during the
cohabitation.
Likewise, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not based
on the status of the parties. Instead, the doctrine is based on
whether one party has made a representation to another so
that the party to whom the representation was made has
relied on that promise to his or her detriment. In a variety of
cases discussed in Part I, the application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel holds persons liable for the support of nonbiological children. For example, in the cases that have
applied the doctrine to stepparents, the courts did not apply
the doctrine because of the status of being a stepparent.
Rather, courts assessed whether it would be just and fair to
impose the duty of support on the stepfather because of his
representation regarding the support for the stepchild, upon
which the child or his parent relied to their detriment.'55
In Zaragoza, the court misapplied the rationale of Miller
when it stated that Miller was not analogous because it was a
stepparent case. It was analogous for determining whether to
apply the principle of equitable estoppel. The issue should
then have become one of policy as to whether to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to cohabitants. Ms. Zaragoza,
as did Mrs. Miller, detrimentally relied upon her partner's
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Featherston,575 N.W.2d at 9.
See Austin v. Austin, 22 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Neb. 1946).
See Rutrowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1955).
492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990).
575 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
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representation that he would support her child, and that she
should not pursue child support from the child's natural
parent. In the stepparent cases, the duty of support was not
based upon the marriage but based upon the principle of
equitable estoppel. Similarly, in Thomas and in Featherson,
the basis for the duty of support was not the status of the
relationship, but whether the principle of equitable estoppel
applied.
It would appear, therefore, that when a jurisdiction
cannot enforce contracts between cohabitants because that
jurisdiction fails to recognize the severance doctrine, then
contracts made by cohabitants to support non-biological,
cohabiting children must be enforced. Even in jurisdictions
that do not enforce contracts between cohabitants, the
traditional doctrines of in loco parentis and equitable estoppel
should apply. These principles extend support to nonbiological persons based upon their voluntary conduct.
Cohabitants should not be excluded if these principles apply
to their conduct.
2. Policy Considerationsfor Applying the Traditional
Theories, Principles,and Policies to Cohabitants
Even though the traditional principles seem to apply to
cohabitants because of their voluntary conduct to support
non-biological cohabiting children of their partners,
nevertheless, there may be policy considerations that would
support or prohibit applying these principles to cohabitants.
This section examines those policy considerations, except for
those regarding the marital tie.'
a. Shaping Law and Policy Regarding Cohabitation
Living Arrangements
American law and policy are still in flux as to
cohabitation living arrangements. While law and policy are
being shaped, the numbers of people living as cohabitants are
a substantial part of society.'57 Many of the same disputes
arise among cohabitants that arise among married
cohabitants.'58 It is predictable that more cases regarding
156. See infra Part II.B (discussing policy considerations regarding the
marital tie).
157. See STATISTICS, supra note 129.
158. Compare Miller, 478 A.2d at 351 (raising issue of stepparent support for
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enforcement of support for non-biological, cohabiting children
will arise given the numbers of cohabiting couples. In
shaping law and policy, there is no apparent reason not to
apply established legal doctrine to resolve cohabiting support
disputes if such doctrine does not conflict with other
principles and policies. Applying non-conflicting principles
will not lessen the integrity of traditional families. For
example, although cohabitation arrangements may be illegal,
the biological children of such cohabitants receive support
from their cohabiting parents on established legal doctrine.'59
A biological parent has a duty to support his or her child
regardless of the living arrangement. Similarly, courts apply
in loco parentis and equitable estoppel doctrines to traditional
legal strangers, not on the basis of contract law or on the
status of the living arrangement, but on other, independent
principles of law. 6 ° As such, even if a jurisdiction will not
enforce contracts between cohabitants, it should apply the
doctrines of in loco parentis and equitable estoppel.
Therefore, applying established legal principles to
cohabitation living arrangements is an appropriate method to
shape law and policy regarding cohabitation disputes.
b. Expectations of Cohabitants
Many persons do not marry because they do not want the
responsibilities that flow from marriage. 6' One, therefore,
would not likely have the expectation of being responsible for
the support of a non-biological, cohabiting child. Moreover,
there are only a few instances in which the law imposes the
duty of support of non-biological children even in marital
arrangements. 62
A person, however, normally becomes
legally bound for non-biological child support because of one's
voluntary promise or conduct.'63 The expectation that one is
responsible for his or her voluntary promise and conduct that
stepchildren when the marriage ends) with Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (raising issue of cohabitant support for partner's
biological child when cohabitation ends).
159. See Zaragoza, 492 A.2d at 700 (cohabitant had a legal duty to support
his biological child, born while he was cohabiting with the plaintiff, after the
cohabitation ended).
160. See supra Part I.B.
161. Reppy, supra note 133, at 1684-85.
162. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
163. See sources cited supra Part I.B.2-3.
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is legally binding, is accepted as part of American culture.
Therefore, applying the traditional doctrines to cohabitants
for non-biological child support is not unexpected when one's
own voluntary promise or conduct would bind him or her
under these established doctrines, which traditionally bind
legal strangers.
c. Welfare of the Children
The welfare of children is a substantial interest of the
state.'64 The number of children living in nontraditional
Although not recognized as a
families"' is not decreasing.'
67
de facto or a legal family,' the cohabitants' children are
certainly living in a nontraditional family arrangement. A
Most
recognized nontraditional family is the step-family.'
states do not impose a duty of support on stepparents unless
their promise or conduct legally binds them.9 Although
children in cohabitation arrangements are not stepchildren,
their economic welfare may be better protected if the state
would apply the traditional principles of non-biological
support to cohabitants. The basis for these principles is not
their status as cohabitants, but on their own legally binding
promise or conduct to support these children.
d. Protectingthe Public Purse
The state's interest in ensuring adequate support for
children reflects its interest in ensuring their support without
public expenditure. This interest is one of the underlying
policies for the legislature in its "preference for assigning
individual responsibility for the care and maintenance of
children; not leaving the task to the taxpayers. That is why it
has gone to considerable lengths to insure parents will live up
164. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the state's interest in the
welfare of children. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (the
state has a "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of
the child"); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)
("[SItate has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child. .. ").
165. See Christensen, supra note 36, at 1302 (The nuclear family, composed
of husband, wife, and their children, is usually considered the traditional
family.).
166. See STATISTICS, supra note 129 (showing increase of total unmarried
couples from 1,589,000 in 1980 to 4,236,000 in 1998).
167. See City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1986).
168. See Mahoney, supra note 51, at 38.
169. See supra Part I.B.2.
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to their support obligations." 7 ' The application of the
traditional reasons for imposing non-biological support on
cohabitants would further the policy of protecting the public
purse and would insure that cohabitants live up to their
support obligations.
B. Policy Considerationsand the Marital Tie
"For many, marriage signifies commitment, emotional
security and stability." 7 ' Marriage, however, has had much
more significance to society than just personal meaning.
Historically, both society and the law used marriage as the
basic unit in the private and public ordering of American
family life.'72 Would allowing non-biological child support in
cohabitation arrangements lessen the importance of marriage
in the private and public ordering of family life? If so, the
marital tie is an important consideration in extending nonbiological support duty to cohabitation arrangements. In
Zaragoza v. Capriola,73 the court, in denying a cohabitant's
petition that her partner had a duty to support her child from
a previous marriage based upon his promise and conduct,
reasoned that "[tihe institution of marriage is not yet dead.
This Court will not contribute to its demise by imposing the
obligations requested."'74 This section examines whether the
policy considerations for extending non-biological child
support to include cohabitants would further the "withering
away of marriage"'75 as the court opined in Zaragoza. The
section concludes that the crucial issue as to whether
cohabitants should have a duty of support to non-biological,
cohabiting children is not so much the involvement of the
marital tie as are the conduct of the cohabitants and other
important interests of the state.

170. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 290 (Ct. App. 1998).
171. Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of UnmarriedPeople in
American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 209 (1987).
172. See June Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of
Marriage and the Public/PrivateDivide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267 (1996);
Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial
Federalism:A View From the States, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 237 (1996).
173. 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.Div. 1985).
174. Id. at 701.
175. The expression "withering away of marriage" is taken from Mary Ann
Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
REV. 663 (1976).
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1. Law, Morals, and Marriage
a. Moral Changesand Acceptance of Cohabitation
Many commentators have observed a change in public
opinion in the United States and in Western society towards
marriage as being the only acceptable, moral living
arrangement. '" Further, there is increasingly less consensus
that the only sexual morality is heterosexual.'77 There are
many factors for these changes in the definition of public
morality. Though the development of family law in America
reveals that the Christian religion has been the cornerstone
for the moral, social, and legal ordering of family law, there
has been a gradual decline among Americans as to its
importance. 78' Along with the decline of the public's interest
in religion, there has been a decrease in discussions of the law
in moral terms as defined by religion. As Professor Carl E.
Schneider and others have described, at the same time as the
decline in religious influence there were both an increasing
influence of the ideology of liberal individualism and the rise
of the psychological view of personal affairs. 7 9
As a result of these and other forces, intolerance for
sexual expression in living arrangements other than
marriage has given way to the moral acceptance, by many, of
heterosexual and homosexual cohabitation. 80 A few concrete
examples demonstrate this growing social acceptance. First,
many cohabiting couples no longer attempt to conceal their
living arrangements from the public, but openly live in such
arrangements. 8 ' Second, the number of such couples
176. See, e.g., id.; see also Arlene Skolnick, The Social Contexts of
Cohabitation,29 AM. J. COMP. L. 339 (1981).
177. See, e.g., Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership:Recognition and
Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163 (1995).
178. See Carbone, supra note 172, at 273; Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex
Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and
Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HOW. L.J. 173 (1992); Jaff,
supra note 171, at 236.
179. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985) (describing various factors
involved in the transformation of family law in the late twentieth century).
180. See, e.g., George W. Madison, Marital and Nonmarital Relationships:
The Right to Alternative Lifestyles, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 200-02
(1979-80); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A
Proposalfor a More Perfect Union, 26 LOy. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980).
181. See Glendon, supra note 175, at 685-86.
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continues to rise dramatically without any indication that
this trend is temporary or will decline in the future.'82 Third,
cohabiting couples are found in all economic groups and social
classes.183 In the past, many considered such arrangements to
be practiced by the poor and certain minority and ethnic
groups, but public acceptance solidified when the middle class
also started openly living in such arrangements.
b. Changes in Constitutionaland State Law
Laws in the United States have also made cohabitation
more acceptable. Beginning with a series of Supreme Court
cases, 185 privacy as a constitutionally protected fundamental
right has evolved into the right of the individual to be free of
governmental interference in his or her sexual conduct,
whether married or not, unless there is a compelling state
interest.8 ' The doctrine of privacy for personal autonomy for
an individual's sexual conduct gives support for the argument
that an individual should be able to choose his or her living
arrangement, whether it be married or unmarried
cohabitation.'87 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not
extended the right of privacy to homosexual conduct and
cohabitation. 8
As a result, the government has more
authority to regulate homosexual conduct if it so chooses.
Thus, such constitutional doctrines as privacy and
fundamental rights have made cohabitation living
arrangements more acceptable.
Until recently, state law considered cohabitation,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, an illicit relationship,
182. See STATISTICS, supra note 129 (showing an increase of total unmarried
couples from 1,589,000 in 1980 to 4,236,000 in 1998).
183. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, CohabitationWithout Marriage:A Different
Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1125, 1128-31 (1981); Glendon, supra note 175,
at 685-86 (1976); Reppy, supra note 133, at 1681-82.
184. See sources cited supra note 183.

185. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a
married couple's constitutional right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972)

(suggesting the constitutional

right of privacy extends to the

individual as well).
186. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES § 2.1, at 76-77 (2d ed. 1988).
187. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE

L.J. 624 (1980); Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter Developments].

188. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute).

186 (1986)

(upholding the
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subject to criminal and civil sanctions."' 9 Many states have
repealed or have not enforced such laws against adultery,
fornication, and sodomy.' ° Moreover, commencing with
Marvin v. Marvin,' many state judicial decisions have also
made cohabitation arrangements more acceptable by settling
property rights of cohabitants.
Even if the living
arrangements may be illicit, the courts have used contract
law and equitable principles in settling such property
rights. 9 ' Thus, changes at both federal and state levels have
made cohabitation living arrangements more tolerable.
c. State Interest in CohabitationLiving Arrangements
The state's interests in cohabitation living arrangements
are intrinsic under both its police powers and its parens
patriae powers. "The police power is the state's inherent
plenary power both to prevent its citizens from harming one
another and to promote all aspects of the public welfare." 3
Accordingly, with the large number of persons living in these
arrangements, 9 " the state has a significant interest in
regulating them.
Under its police powers, the state would have the
authority to regulate public morality unless the Constitution
limits that authority. 5
Thus, rejecting or accepting
cohabitation as illicit is within the state's authority.
Moreover, many issues arise between cohabitants that are
rooted in this type of living arrangement.' When individuals
cannot resolve issues, they normally turn to the courts for
guidance and resolution. In light of the number of citizens
affected,' the state has an interest in providing guidance and
189. See Reppy, supra note 133, at 1678-81; Michael A. Willemsen, Justice
Tobriner and the Tolerance of Evolving Lifestyles: Adapting Law to Social
Change, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 74 (1977).
190. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.03 (West 2000) (repealed 1983)
(fornication); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-219 (West 2000) (repealed)
(fornication).
191. 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976) (seminal case).
192. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980) (following
Marvin's severability doctrine); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987)
(following Marvin and other theories).
193. Developments, supra note 187, at 1198.
194. See STATISTICS, supra note 129.
195. See Developments, supra note 187, at 1202.
196. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976); Blumberg, supra note
183, at 1128-31.
197. See STATISTICS, supra note 129.
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access to19 the law in resolving issues relating to these
concerns.

8

Furthermore, the state's interest in cohabitation
arrangements appears to have become more acute when
larger numbers of its middle class citizens accepted
cohabitation as a living arrangement of choice. 9 The state
was dealing with values, norms, and customs of a segment of
its community, which has power in determining what the law
is. 200 The state's interest in the welfare of this community, the

fundamental basis of society, is not surprising.
The state also has an important interest in cohabitation
if society views it as a viable alternative to marriage.2 9' Some
argue that cohabitation should be treated as a type of family
if it functions as the traditional family.0 2 Others claim that
cohabitation is not temporary, but represents a culmination
of changes that have been evolving as an alternative to
marriage.03 Still others argue that cohabitation should be
treated as an alternative to marriage, because many people
reject marriage but find the same positive values associated
with marriage in cohabitation arrangements. 4
The state's interest in marriage, as a basic unit in
structuring family life, is of no small importance.2 '
Therefore, the state's interest in protecting marriage as an
institution is significant. One aspect of the state's protection
of marriage is not to discourage marriage. The state has an
interest, therefore, in not making cohabitation as a lifestyle

198. See Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 660.
199. See Eleanor D. Macklin, Heterosexual CohabitationAmong Unmarried
College Students, 21 THE FAM. COORDINATOR 463 (1972); Reppy, supra note
133, at 1681-82; Skolnick, supra note 176, at 341.
200. See Reppy, supra note 133; Schneider, supra note 179, at 1852.
201. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 51, at 45.
202. See City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Gary B.
Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and
Families, 22 GA. L. REV. 851 (1988); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance:
The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104
HARv. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
203. See Skolnick, supra note 176.
204. See Anne E. Simerman, The Right of a Cohabitant to Recover in Tort:
Wrongful Death, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of
Consortium, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 531, 542 (1993-94).
205. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW:
STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 292-93

(1989) ("[Mlodern family law... remains marriage-centered in many ways.").

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

more attractive than marriage."' The state would allow
obligations and consequences to flow from marriage as a
lifestyle, but none flow from the cohabitation lifestyle. The
conduct of stepparents binds them to support their nonbiological children, but the same conduct would not bind
cohabitants." 7 At the same time, the state has an interest in
not making cohabitation so similar to marriage as to
discourage marriage." 8

On the other hand, under the state's parens patriae
power,0 9 the state has an obligation to protect non-biological
children living in these cohabitation arrangements. Among
the various issues that arise concerning the care of them is
the issue of adequate financial support, especially without
resort to public expenditures. Therefore, the state has an
interest in the financial sources for the support of these
children both during cohabitation and after it ends.
d. Shift in Law from Public Ordering to Private
Ordering
There has also been a shift in family law from public
ordering to private ordering.210 The Supreme Court has
supported this shift through its interpretation, in privacy
cases, of fundamental rights as they relate to personal
autonomy of the individual to make various decisions about
This shift facilitates cohabitation. Under
family life. 2
private ordering, persons should have the choice privately to
order their living arrangements through cohabitation or
publicly to order their living arrangements through marriage.
2. Adapting Law to Social Changes or Adapting Society
to Changes in the Law?
Have the changes in the law regarding cohabitation
occurred because the law adapted to society's change in its
treatment of cohabitation? Or, has society adapted to the
206. See Reppy, supra note 133, at 1684.
207. See supra Part I.B.2.
208. See Reppy, supra note 133, at 1721.
209. See Lawrence B. Cusler, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae,
27 EMoRY L.J. 195 (1978).
210. See generally Christensen, supra note 36; Developments, supra note 187;
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443
(1992).
211. See Developments, supra note 187, at 1198.
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law's change in its treatment of cohabitation?
Does the acceptance of cohabitation represent a
fundamental change in contemporary society's mores? If so,
then should the law adapt to the social change in order to
The
promote the general welfare of its citizens?
demographics of cohabitation support this view.212 They
demonstrate that this living arrangement has steadily
risen,21' and has become both commonplace and accepted as
an alternative lifestyle." 4 Apparently, a major underpinning
of Marvin was the court's belief that society's mores had
changed. "The mores of the society have indeed changed so
radically in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a
standard based on alleged moral considerations that have
apparently been so widely abandoned by so many."1 5 In
addition, the Marvin court observed that demographics
indicated large numbers of persons were living in these
arrangements."' Marvin's response can be interpreted as the
state's interest in regulating unmarried cohabitation, but,
instead of coming from the legislature, the judiciary assumed
its role to settle disputes between private parties by
grounding its ruling in familiar private doctrinal law:
contract and equitable principles. 7 Marvin's response to
societal changes may also be interpreted as the court's taking
a neutral moral stand to cohabitation arrangements.218 In
any event, Marvin arguably supports the view that law
reflects society's attitudes and mores.1 9 On the other hand,
Marvin was the catalyst for courts in other states to treat
cohabitation other than an illicit relationship for all purposes.
Many states have adopted some or all of Marvin's holding
that cohabitation does not per se prevent cohabitants from
212. See STATISTICS, supra note 129.
213. See id. (showing increase of total unmarried couples from 1,589,000 in
1980 to 4,236,000 in 1998).
214. See Blumberg, supra note 183, at 1128-31; Glendon, supra note 175, at
685-86 (1976); Reppy, supra note 133, at 1681-82.
215. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684 (1976).
216. See id. at 665, 683.
217. See Joseph Grodin, Justice Tobriner:Portraitof the Judge as an Artist,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 7 (1977); Willemsen, supra note 189.
218. See George P. Ritter, Note, Property Rights of a Same-Sex Couple: The
Outlook After Marvin, 12 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 409, 412 (1979).
219. See, e.g., Joseph Grodin, supra note 217; Martha Minow, "Forming

Underneath Everything that Grows," Toward a History of Family Law, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 819; Willemsen, supra note 189.
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contracting with one another."' Furthermore, some states
have passed laws repealing adultery,"1 fornication, 2 and
cohabitation... statutes as well as enacted statutes
Domestic
prohibiting marital status discrimination. 24
Partnership laws passed by many municipalities extend
certain economic benefits to the cohabitant's domestic partner
because of the cohabitant's employment; previously, only
spouses were entitled to such benefits.2
It is probably accurate to conclude in this article that the
changes in the law were precipitated by many persons living
publicly as cohabitants, as a result of society's changes in its
morality. These changes resulted in greater tolerance and
acceptance of these living arrangements. One must also
conclude that as one jurisdiction responded with legal
remedies, that other jurisdictions followed. Therefore, social
and legal changes appear as reciprocal changes in their
treatment of cohabitation.
3. TraditionalPrinciplesUnderlyingLegal Strangers'
Duty of Support of Non-Biological Children Usually
Stems from Conduct and Not from the Marital Tie
When there is no biological tie, the duty of support is
usually based on the doctrine of in loco parentis,contract law,
or the doctrine of equitable estoppel."' The obligation for
stepparent support in most cases is not based on the
stepparent status, unless there is a specific statute
addressing stepparent status. 27 Without such statutes, the
imposition of the duty of support on most stepparents flows
from their voluntary conduct, rather than a marital tie. 8
220. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980); Watts v.
Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). Others have rejected Marvin's holding.
See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
221. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4505 (Supp. 1971-72) (repealed 1972).
222. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-219 (West 2000) (repealed 1971).
223. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.03 (West 2000) (repealed 1983).
224. See John C. Beattie, Note, ProhibitingMarital Status Discrimination:A
Proposalfor the Protectionof UnmarriedCouples, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1415, 1433
(1991).
225. See Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex
Relationships:A Marketplace Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional
Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998); O'Brien, supra note 177.
226. See supra Part I.C.
227. See supra Part I.B.2.
228. See MAHONEY, supra note 34, at 16.
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Stepparents generally obligate themselves, because they are
in loco parentis status with the stepchild,229 are in a contract
to support the stepchild, 3 ° or their conduct may have resulted
in an obligation to support stepchildren based on the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.23 ' Similarly, husbands who are denied
the request to prove non-paternity of extra marital children
are usually prohibited because of their own conduct and not
because of the presumption that children born to a married
22
woman are presumed to be children of the husband. 8
Therefore, if the obligation is because of conduct in most cases
dealing with stepparents and presumed fathers, then a
marital tie should not be a factor with cohabitants.
4. TraditionalLegal StrangersAlready Include Those
Who are Beyond the Marital Tie
Stepparents and presumed fathers are legal strangers
who are connected by the marital tie. Although they make up
the largest group of traditional legal strangers that may have
a duty of support for non-biological children, others with no
marital tie have also been among the traditional legal
strangers. This group includes persons who have taken
children into their homes to rear,"' or persons who have
agreed to the birth of non-biological children through
artificial insemination, 34 or persons who have guaranteed
parental support. 2 5

All of these legal strangers obligated

themselves to support non-biological children, where there
was no marital tie because of their own conduct.2 6 The basis
for imposing the duty of support in these cases is the conduct
of these legal strangers. Therefore, the lack of the marital tie
should not preclude extending the duty of non-biological child
support to cohabitants based upon their conduct.
III. CONCLUSION

The basic reason for allowing support obligations by
229. See, e.g., Deal v. Deal, 545 So. 2d 780 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
230. See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. App. 1968).
231. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
232. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Ct. App. 1961).
233. See, e.g., A.S. v. B.S., 354 A.2d 100 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), affd
374 A.2d 1259 (N.J. App. Div. 1977).
234. See, e.g., Karin T. v. Michael T, 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
235. See, e.g., Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852 (1975).
236. See supra Part I.B.4.
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traditional legal strangers where there is no biological tie, but
a marital tie, is that they have voluntarily agreed to support
the child under either the doctrine of in loco parentis,contract
law, or the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Seldom are they
ever statutorily drafted because of the status of the marital
relationship. Other traditional legal strangers, where there
is neither a legal nor a marital tie, become obligated because
of their voluntary conduct. Determining whether cohabitants
should be responsible for supporting non-biological,
cohabiting children need not be entangled with the legal
recognition or nonrecognition of cohabitation because support
obligations for non-biological children have not been based
upon the status of the marital relationship, except in a few
statutory instances. For the 21st century it might be an issue
if stepparent obligation is based more and more on the status
of the marriage.237 Therefore, how far beyond the marital tie
should legal strangers have a duty of support for nonbiological, cohabiting children? This article contends that
legal strangers should be obligated to the extent that their
own actions and conduct would bind them under the
principles of in loco parentis, contract law, or equitable
estoppel. 8'

237. At least one of the stepparent statutes appears explicitly to include
cohabitants:
Where the parents are unable to provide a minor child's minimum
needs, a stepparent or a person who cohabits in the relationship of
husband and wife with the parent of a minor child shall be under a
duty to provide those needs. Such duty shall exist only while the child
makes his residence with such stepparent or person and the marriage
or cohabitation continues.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 50(b) (1998).
238. In the case of the switched babies, Carlton Conley signed a handwritten
agreement, drafted by Paula Johnson, agreeing to pay $75.00 per week for the
support of Callie Marie Conley after Judge Somerville refused to order support
because there was no biological tie between him and Callie Marie. David Reed,
Mother of Switched Baby Retains Custody, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE AND
LOCAL WIRE, Sept. 22, 1998. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.

